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COMMENTS
RACE AS A FACTOR IN K-12 STUDENT
ASSIGNMENT PLANS: BALANCING THE PROMISE
OF BROWN WITH THE MODERN REALITIES OF
STRICT SCRUTINY
Michael J. Anderson*
Over fifty years after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown
v. Board of Education,' the issue of racial integration in American public
schools is gaining renewed attention.2  As courts have dissolved
mandatory desegregation decrees3 and schools increasingly have become
segregated again, 4 many school districts have implemented voluntary
integration plans. Stressing the importance of integrated schools in our
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank his wife, Bronwyn, for her patience, love, and
unwavering support. In addition, the author would like to thank Rebecca Troth for her
insight and advice.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the intentional segregation of students by race
in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
2. See ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 6 (2002) (noting that in
schools with an enrollment larger than 25,000, racial segregation is increasing), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg[Race-in-American-Public-Scho
olsl.pdf. Research indicates that "decreasing black and Latino exposure to white students
. . . [and] declining white exposure to blacks and Latinos" is occurring in many school
districts throughout the United States. Id. at 22.
3. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (upholding the incremental
release of the DeKalb County (Ga.) School District from a court-ordered desegregation
plan); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (releasing
the school district from a court-ordered desegregation plan implemented in 1972). See
generally MARY F. EHRLANDER, EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: BROWN'S
ELUSIVE MANDATE 276 (2002) (describing the Supreme Court's retreat from mandatory
desegregation orders beginning in the 1990s); ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM?
69-75 (2003) (providing an overview of desegregation rulings between 1990 and 2002),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingthe
Dream.pdf.
4. See FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 2, at 6 (noting the resegregation of schools
in many large districts between 1986 and 2000). For example, in one Georgia school
district Black exposure to Whites declined by forty-five percent and Latino exposure to
Whites declined by nearly sixty percent over the fourteen years studied. Id.
5. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
21791, at *9 (1st Cir. Oct 20, 2004) (describing a Massachusetts school district's transfer
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increasingly diverse society, one federal district court judge recently
observed, "In order to teach that the 'content of [one's] character' does
not depend on color, a child must interact with children of other races."6
Despite noble goals, however, recent legal attacks on voluntary
integration plans threaten the ability of school districts to use race as a
factor when carrying out such programs.'
Legal challenges to voluntary integration plans in public schools have
arisen against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases.' Although the
Michigan cases helped settle many questions regarding the use of race in
program designed to integrate schools that would otherwise be segregated due to housing
patterns), withdrawn and reh'g en bane granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir.
Nov. 24, 2004); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949,
954-55 (2004) (describing the Seattle School District's high school enrollment plan that
was designed to ameliorate the effects of segregated housing patterns on racial
representation in high schools throughout the district), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,
395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005); Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub.
Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 125-26 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing a Maryland school district's
enrollment plan for magnet schools that was designed to foster racial integration).
6. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333-34 (D.
Mass. 2003) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A CALL TO
CONSCIENCE: LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 75 (2002)), affd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21791 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004). Similarly, Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson III has commented on the integrative ideals stemming from Brown:
The values of Brown are most poignantly implicated [in public education],
because society has traditionally relied upon public schools to lay the bedrock for
integration. Elementary and secondary schools were not only designed to
prepare students for the challenges and opportunities of American life; they were
also meant to serve as melting pots where interracial friendship could counteract
prejudice at an early age. Separatist educational arrangements threaten both of
these traditional goals.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in
Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1018-19 (1995) (footnote omitted).
7. See, e.g., Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *51 (striking down a
voluntary student transfer program designed to reduce racial segregation); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 988-89 (striking down a high school student assignment
plan designed to foster racially integrated schools). Challenges to race-based policies in
K-12 settings are based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution which
commands that "[nlo State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003) (holding that achieving
diversity in public university admissions is a compelling governmental interest so long as
the methods used are narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions policy was not narrowly tailored).
[Vol. 54:961
Race as a Factor in K-12 Student Assignment Plans
higher education admissions,9 the decisions have not settled the
simmering debate on the use of race as a factor in student assignment
decisions for kindergarten through twelfth grade (K-12) public schools.'
Lacking clear guidance from the Supreme Court in the K-12 context,
courts must reconcile the legacy of Brown with the Court's recent
affirmative action jurisprudence in higher education."
Challenges to voluntary race-based policies in K-12 public schools
initially focused on the use of race as a factor in determining admission to
magnet schools and selective high schools.'2  More recently, the
controversy in K-12 schools has shifted to more general student
assignment and transfer plans that do not involve such specialized
programs.' 3 Lower courts have variously struck down and upheld such
policies using race as a factor in student placements.4
Since the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the voluntary use
of race as a factor in K-12 educational decisions," lower courts have
9. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *31-32 (noting that Grutter clarified the
Court's position that having a diverse student body in university admissions is a
compelling interest and defined the parameters of narrow tailoring analysis when
evaluating race-based university admissions policies).
10. See James Nial Robinson II, Trying To Push a Square Peg Through a Round
Hole: Why the Higher Education Style of Strict Scrutiny Review Does Not Fit When Courts
Consider K-12 Admissions Programs, 2004 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 51, 73 ("The circuit
courts are divided on the constitutionality of [K-12 admissions] programs, and the lower
courts are just now beginning to digest the implications of the Supreme Court's recent
University of Michigan decisions."). Robinson explains that "[slome courts have applied
strict scrutiny review [in K-12 cases] . . . in much the same manner [as they do] . . .
affirmative action in higher education. On the other hand, other courts distinguish
between the K-12 and higher education programs and attempt to tailor their analysis
accordingly." Id.
11. Id. (explaining that until the Supreme Court considers race-based policies in K-12
settings, lower courts likely will hear many cases regarding K-12 school assignment plans).
The First Circuit alluded to the lack of clarity in this area in Comfort, using the Supreme
Court's analytical framework from the higher education context until the Court addresses
the issue in K-12 settings. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *51.
12. See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d
123, 125 (4th Cir. 1999) (concerning the school district's policy on the assignment of
students to magnet schools); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1998)
(concerning the Boston School District's admission policy for three elite high schools).
13. See, e.g., Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (involving a challenge to a school
district's generally applicable student transfer policy); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving a challenge to the school
district's high school assignment policy), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 1168
(9th Cir. 2005).
14. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch,, 377 F.3d at 988-89 (striking down the
school district's high school assignment policy); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist.,
212 F.3d 738, 753 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding an urban-suburban interdistrict student
transfer policy).
15. See Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *6.
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relied on the Court's decisions regarding race-based policies in public
university admissions.16 Prior to the Michigan decisions, courts sought
guidance from the Supreme Court's fractured decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 7 where a divided Court recognized
that public universities could permissibly consider race in admissions."'
The recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger9 has clarified the Court's
position on the permissible use of race in the admissions process for
higher education by affirming that achieving diversity is a compelling
governmental interest.20 Recently, lower courts have applied these
principles to K-12 settings.21
This Comment examines the use of race as a factor in K-12 public
school assignment and transfer plans. First, this Comment traces the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning race-based policies in
American public schools and other settings. Next, this Comment
addresses recent litigation concerning race-based policies in the K-12
context. This Comment then analyzes the application of the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence to K-12 situations, including what
constitutes a compelling state interest and how school districts must
narrowly tailor their actions to achieve that interest. Finally, this
Comment suggests that courts and school districts must carefully weigh
the ideals of Brown against the realities of strict scrutiny when
considering race-based policies in K-12 settings.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION: FROM
MANDATORY TO VOLUNTARY
A. Mandatory Remedies for De Jure Segregation
In 1954 the Supreme Court dramatically changed the landscape of
many public school systems when it repudiated the doctrine of "separate
but equal"22 within the context of public education.2 ' The Court's
16. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 960-63; Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999); Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130-35.
17. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18. Id. at 315.
19. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
20. See J. Kevin Jenkins, Grutter, Diversity, and Public K-12 Schools, 182 ED. L. REP.
353, 353 (2004) ("[I]n Grutter, the Court clarified an area of law that had been decidedly
unclear since the Bakke decision.").
21. See, e.g., Comfort, No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *41-42 (1st Cir.
Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh "g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir.
Nov. 24, 2004); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 964.
22. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (sustaining a Louisiana law that
called for separate but equal accommodations for White and Black railroad passengers).
The Plessy decision provided justification for government-sponsored racial segregation
[Vol. 54:961
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decision in Brown, holding de jure segregation in public schools
unconstitutional, began the difficult process of dismantling the racially
21segregated school systems that pervaded much of the South.
Cases following Brown further shaped the process of desegregation.26
In Green v. County School Board,' the Court intervened when a Virginia
school system attempted to circumvent the Brown mandate to
desegregate by using a parental choice program that, when applied,
preserved segregated schools within the district. 2' The Court struck
down the system, reinforcing the desegregation mandate of Brown and
establishing an "affirmative" duty for boards of education to integrate
schools.2 9
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,0 the Court
addressed the problems of desegregating schools in large urban areas
that lasted for over fifty years. See EHRLANDER, supra note 3, at 6-8 (describing the
Plessy decision and its impact on segregation).
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal"). Richard Kluger has described Brown as
"nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals," explaining:
The Court had restored to the American people a measure of the humanity that
had been drained away in their climb to worldwide supremacy. The Court said,
without using the words, that that ascent had been made over the backs of black
America-and that when you stepped on a black man, he hurt. The time had
come to stop.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 710 (1975).
24. The Court has defined de jure segregation as "resulting from intentional state
action." Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973).
25. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (indicating the complexities involved in providing relief
due to the wide applicability of the decisions and the unique conditions present in local
school districts). In a follow-up decision the next year, the Court ordered school districts
to desegregate with "all deliberate speed." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955). The Court placed the districts involved under the supervision of the courts in
which the claims originated, ordering districts to take steps to facilitate the transition from
a dual system of schools to a unitary system. Id. at 299.
26. See infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
27. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
28. Id. at 433-34 (considering an open choice enrollment system that allowed parents
to choose which school their children would attend). The district consisted of only two
schools from which students could choose-one was traditionally all Black and the other
all White. Id. at 432. Under the plan, no White children chose to attend the Black school.
Id. at 441. While 115 Black children opted to attend the White school, eighty-five percent
of all Black children remained in their prior school. Id.
29. Id. at 437-38 (stating that school boards have an "affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"). The Court further held school
boards were required to demonstrate that any plan would provide "meaningful and
immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation." Id. at 439.
30. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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where official policies had exacerbated the effects of de facto segregation
resulting from housing patterns.3' By permitting the use of busing as a
means to integrate schools, the Court acknowledged "a presumption
against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial
composition. ,32
The Supreme Court further expanded its desegregation jurisprudence
when it addressed mandatory integration of schools in a northern city for
the first time in Keyes v. School District No. 1.33 While the South had
created segregated schools through direct, official policies, school
segregation in urban areas outside the South was a result of less obvious
official polices that capitalized on racially segregated housing patterns.34
In Keyes, the district court found that Denver had operated its school
system under long-running and subtle policies such as gerrymandered
attendance zones and school construction to contain Black expansion
into White schools.35
31, Id. at 7. The Court stated that de facto segregation exists "where racial imbalance
exists in the schools but with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory
actions of state authorities." Id. at 17-18. At the time, the district was the forty-third
largest in the country, encompassing Charlotte, North Carolina and the surrounding
county. Id. at 6-7. The Court acknowledged that the school board decisions did not create
the segregated housing, but found that the boards actions based on the housing patterns
"resulted in segregated education." Id. at 7.
32. Id. at 26,
33. 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973). By acknowledging in Swann that de facto segregation
could lead to unconstitutional results when accompanied by discriminatory intent on the
part of school boards, the Court paved the way for desegregation cases in the North. See
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN To BAKKE 194-99 (1979) (indicating that while
rural areas of the South became leaders in school integration, students in major cities in
the North continued to attend substantially segregated schools).
34. See WILKINSON III, supra note 33, at 195-99. Colorado's State Constitution
prohibited segregated schools and the state generally had a positive history of race
relations. Id. When Denver's Black population began to grow, however, many Whites
were resistant to the encroachment of Black students into predominately White schools.
Id. Trying to keep the schools in the Park Hill neighborhood of the city White as long as
possible, the school board rescinded a voluntary integration program and engaged in
practices designed to maintain predominately White schools. Id.
35. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 192. Although there was no statutory dual system in Denver,
the Court did cite evidence that the school district had "engaged in an unconstitutional
policy of deliberate racial segregation. . . '[with] an undeviating purpose to isolate Negro
students' in segregated schools." Id. at 198-99 (citation omitted). The Court found that
where intentional actions on the part of a school board resulted in segregation in
meaningful portions of a district, the district shouldered the burden of demonstrating that
segregation in schools in other portions of the district was not the result of segregative
intent. Id. at 208-09. If a district failed to meet this burden, mandatory desegregation was
necessary. Id. at 213. The Court stated that where "school authorities have carried out a
systematic program of segregation . . . it is only common sense to conclude that there
exists a predicate for finding the existence of a dual system." Id. at 201. Although it was
more difficult to establish de jure segregation in northern cities, court-ordered integration
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B. The Court's Implied Approval of Voluntary Integration Plans
Brown and its progeny mandated integration in school districts where
de jure segregation existed;3 6 however, the Supreme Court did not
mandate integration where there had been only de facto desegregation."
Driven by the goals of Brown and the threat of litigation, some districts
voluntarily implemented programs to integrate schools within their
boundaries." Although the Court never directly addressed voluntary
integration programs in its desegregation jurisprudence, it did address
the issue indirectly.39
The Court first hinted at the permissibility of voluntary integration
40plans in Swann. In dicta, the Court indicated that the power to
implement voluntary integration programs was within the school board's
traditional power to set educational policy.4 In a companion case, North
was no longer strictly a southern issue after Keyes. See WILKINSON III, supra note 33, at
198-99. The difficulty in demonstrating de jure segregation in the North stemmed from
the fact that segregation had to be tied to official wrongdoing. Id. In the South, school
desegregation statutes created a presumption that segregation resulted from nefarious
intent. Id. at 198. In the North, plaintiffs faced the more tedious effort of examining past
school board decisions to demonstrate that official policies led to segregated schools. Id.
at 198-99.
36. See discussion supra Part I.A.
37. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208-09 (emphasizing that intent is the differentiating factor
between de jure segregation, which necessitates a remedy, and de facto integration). See
generally Mark Tushnet, Implementing, Transforming, and Abandoning Brown, in BROWN
AT 50: THE UNFINISHED LEGACY 128, 132 (Deborah L. Rhode & Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
eds., 2004) (describing how courts confined their desegregation mandates to situations
involving deliberate decisions, either through statutory law or administrative processes,
that resulted in segregation).
38. See supra text accompanying note 5 (indicating recent court decisions concerning
voluntary integration plans in public schools); see also Kevin Brown, The Constitutionality
of Racial Classifications in Public School Admissions, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (2000)
("Driven by federal court decrees, political beliefs that an integrated society was a better
one, and educational policy decisions fostering multiculturalism, many public elementary
and secondary schools instituted voluntary measures to produce integrated student
bodies.").
39. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text (describing numerous cases in which
the Supreme Court has indicated at least tacit support for voluntary integration plans).
40. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
41. Id. (noting that the powers of local authorities are broader than the remedial
powers of federal courts). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate
and implement educational policy and might well conclude . . . that in order to
prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion of the
district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers for school authorities.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:961
42
Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, the Court reinforced its
position, stating that "as a matter of educational policy school authorities
may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is
desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements. 43
Justice Powell expressed his approval for voluntary integration plans in
two desegregation cases." In a concurring opinion in Keyes, he
supported the proposition that school boards could initiate policies to
promote integration, asserting that nothing prevented school boards
from "exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the
values of an integrated school experience. 4 1 Justice Powell again
commented on voluntary integration in a dissenting opinion in Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick. 6 Voicing his approval of a voluntary
majority to minority transfer program in Wisconsin, he stated that such




In Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, the Court upheld a California
Supreme Court ruling requiring desegregation based on provisions of the
California State Constitution.49 Writing for the majority, then Justice
Rehnquist held that states could permissibly "impose more stringent
restrictions on the operation of a local school board" than federal courts
42. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
43. Id. at 45.
44. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 488 n.7 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 242 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[lI]t is essential that ... students
of all races learn to play, work, and cooperate with one another in their common pursuits
and endeavors.").
46. Penick, 443 U.S. at 488 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority in Penick
supported the district court's determination that the Columbus Board of Education acted
with a segregative purpose which had a current impact on the district and warranted a
mandatory desegregation order. Id. at 468. In his dissent, Justice Powell stated his belief
that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that intentional violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment led to the segregated schools. Id. at 480 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Rather, he believed that the district court made a conclusory determination based merely
on the absence of integration in the district. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Powell expressed concerns with the coercive nature of judicial mandates, he acknowledged
the importance of integrated schools, stating that "[it is essential that the diverse peoples
of our country learn to live in harmony and mutual respect. This end is furthered by when
young people attend schools with diverse student bodies." Id. at 485 n.5 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
47. Id. at 488 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
48. 439 U.S. 1380 (1978).
49. Id. at 1383 (denying a stay of the California Supreme Court's order to implement
a desegregation plan in Los Angeles). The California court ordered the plan after finding
that de facto segregation was prohibited under its state constitution. Id.
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had the authority to do.50 Justice Rehnquist explained that he had "very
little doubt" that California was within its powers to act in the absence of
a federal court mandate.5
The Court again addressed the application of state law to
desegregation policies aimed at remedying de facto segregation in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.52 The Seattle School District
had implemented a mandatory busing plan to bring racial balance to its
schools.53 In response, opponents of the plan gained statewide approval
of an initiative that made mandatory busing for purposes of racial
integration illegal 4  The Supreme Court struck down the state's anti-
busing initiative, allowing the district to implement mandatory busing.55
Thus, Seattle was able to maintain a voluntary desegregation program
that went beyond Constitutional requirements.56
C. Equal Protection and Affirmative Action
1. Race as a Factor in Higher Education Admissions
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the use of voluntary
measures aimed at desegregation of public schools, the Court has
addressed affirmative action policies in other contexts.57 One such area,
58most parallel to K-12 public schools, is higher education. The Court
50. Id. at 1382.
51. Id. at 1383.
52. 458 U.S. 457, 459-61 (1982).
53. Id. at 461.
54. Id. at 461-63.
55. Id. at 470 (basing its decision on equal protection grounds because the initiative
used race as a defining element in restricting local decisionmaking). The Court explained
that prior to the initiative, decisions such as student assignments and desegregation were
"firmly committed to the local board's discretion" and "[t]he question of whether to
provide an integrated learning environment rather than a system of neighborhood
schools" fell within that discretion. Id. at 479-80. The initiative placed the authority to
order desegregative busing in state hands, and in so doing differentiated between issues
involving racial matters and those that did not. Id. at 480. By removing only the power to
address racial decisions, the initiative created an impermissible distinction based on race.
Id. at 486-87.
56. See Brown, supra note 38, at 10.
57. See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing the Supreme Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence in higher education and government contracting and employment).
58. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at
*46 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (indicating that the higher education decisions in Grutter and
Gratz set forth "relevant guideposts" for evaluating the state's interest in achieving
diversity in K-12 settings), withdrawn and reh'g en bane granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004). Although both higher education and K-12 settings involve
public education, there remain substantial differences that affect the application of
affirmative action in higher education versus the K-12 context. See infra Part II.B-C.
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first addressed affirmative integration policies, or affirmative action,
within public higher education in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke 9 where it considered a challenge to the admissions policy of the
60
Medical School of the University of California at Davis. With Justice
Powell providing the deciding vote for a divided court,6' the Court struck
down the university's admissions plan but upheld some consideration of
race as a factor in the admissions process.2
In his opinion, Justice Powell recognized that diversity was a
63compelling interest in university admissions, but he found that the
program's racial classification was not necessarily tailored to promote
that interest.6 He found it significant that applicants were competing for
a limited number of positions, and the use of race guaranteed a specific
number of positions to some students based on race, excluding Whites
from being considered for those positions. In the competitive process of
medical school admissions, he determined that race was permissible as a
"plus" factor, but could not be used to "insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.
"66
59. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. Id. at 269-70. A White male applicant who had been denied admission to the
school brought the action, challenging the school's special admission program in which
sixteen of 100 positions were reserved for minority students. See id. at 275-79.
61. Id. at 271-72. See generally WILKINSON III, supra note 33, at 299-301 (describing
Justice Powell's role in serving as the middle ground between four justices fully in favor of
the university's plan and four justices wholly opposed to any use of race as a factor in
admissions). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist argued
that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act precluded the university from using race to deny
admission. Id. at 299-300. On the other hand, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun argued that Title VI and the Constitution allowed for the use of race as a means
to overcome past discrimination. Id. at 300. Justice Powell agreed in striking down the
university's admissions plan, but he also agreed with the latter group in upholding some
use of race as a factor in admissions decisions. Id. at 302.
62. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (affirming the California Supreme Court's decision
invalidating the university's admission program but recognizing that "the State has a
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin").
63. Id. at 314-15 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell stated that the "attainment of
a diverse student body" was "clearly a constitutionally permissible goal for a institution of
higher education." Id. at 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.).
64. Id. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).
65. Id. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell explained that under the
medical school's plan "[n]o matter how strong [an applicant's] qualifications ...they
[were] never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups"
for a set number of positions. Id. at 319 (opinion of Powell, J.).
66. Id. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell cited a Harvard University
admissions policy as an example of a permissible policy. Id. at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.).
The policy stated that race could be used to "tip the balance" in favor of one qualified
candidate over another in order to achieve a diverse student body. Id. at 315 (opinion of
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The splintered decision in Bakke upholding diversity as a compelling
state interest and acknowledging that universities could use race as a
factor in admissions did not end the debate over race in admissions.67
Because Bakke lacked a clear rationale for the majority holding, the
decision was not universally embraced.60
The uncertainty Bakke engendered was clarified when the Court again
addressed affirmative action in higher education admissions in Grutter v.
Bollinger69 and Gratz v. Bollinger." Both cases concerned admissions
policies at the University of Michigan, Grutter involving a challenge to
the law school's admissions policy7 and Gratz dealing with a challenge to
the undergraduate admissions policy. 72  Like Bakke, both cases
concerned highly-competitive admissions programs in which applicants
were compared using merit-based criteria.73
In Grutter, the Court clarified Bakke by endorsing Justice Powell's
74rationale. In a five to four decision, the Court held diversity to be a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race as a factor in
public university admissions.75 Highlighting the benefits stemming from
Powell, J.). The policy also indicated that although the university was to avoid quotas,
"some attention to numbers" was necessary to have sufficient numbers to realize the
benefits of diversity and avoid the problem of diverse groups feeling isolated. Id. at 323
(opinion of Powell, J.).
67. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down the
University of Texas School of Law's admissions program).
68. See id. at 944. The Hopwood court questioned the continued vitality of Bakke,
holding that "consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body [was] not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
69. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
70. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
71. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311.
72. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249-50. The Court struck down the undergraduate admissions
program on narrow tailoring grounds. Id. at 251. Under the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions program, each applicant accrued points, needing at least 100
points to secure admission. Id. at 255. The points were awarded based on academic merit,
quality and rigor of high school curriculum, in-state residency, alumni relationship,
personal essay, and personal achievement or leadership. Id. Applicants who were part of
an underrepresented minority group gained an extra twenty points under a
"miscellaneous" category. Id. The Court found that the university's use of a points
system that automatically gave a minority student one-fifth of the points needed to
guarantee admission had the effect of making the use of race decisive. Id. at 271-72.
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-14 (indicating that the law school admits only about ten
percent of applicants and that it admits only those students who are "among the most
capable"); see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
74. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
75. Id. In reaching its decision, the Court deferred to the law school's judgment that
diversity was critical to its educational mission, noting that the Court has "long recognized
that ... universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." Id. at 328-29.
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diversity, the Court noted that the "admissions policy promotes 'cross-
racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and
'enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.' 7 6 In
securing the benefits of a diverse student body, the Court accepted the
law school's determination that it needed a "critical mass" of• • 77
underrepresented miorities.
The Court also upheld the law school's plan on the grounds that it was
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest."' It
determined that to be narrowly tailored, an admissions plan: (1) cannot
involve an impermissible quota or racial balancing and must be
sufficiently flexible so as to consider each applicant as an individual; (2)
must take into account race-neutral alternatives; (3) must not impose an
undue burden on third parties; and (4) must be limited in time."
Evaluating each of these factors, the Court determined that the law
school had met the standard of strict scrutiny80
In applying the narrow-tailoring factors, the Court first found that the
"goal of attaining a critical mass" of minority students did not constitute
a quota."' The Court honed in on the evidence that the school's review of
The Court based its deference on First Amendment grounds, explaining that educational
autonomy includes the ability of a university to select its student body so as to promote a
"robust exchange of ideas." Id. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted).
76. Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). As support for its position,
the Court cited social science evidence that "diversity promotes learning outcomes and
'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society."' Id. (quoting
Brief of Amici Curiae American Educational Research Association et al. at 3, Grutter
(No. 02-241)). Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed with the majority on this point,
asserting that any benefits derived from diversity are out place in the law school setting.
Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia stated
that diversity is "a lesson of life rather than law." Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 333. The law school described "critical mass" as "enough to create
significant opportunities for personal interaction, to show that there is no consistent
'minority viewpoint' on particular issues, and to ensure that 'minority students do not feel
isolated or like spokespersons for their race, and feel comfortable discussing issues freely
based on their personal experiences."' Respondent's Brief at *2-3, Grutter (No. 02-241),
2003 WL 402236 (citation omitted).
78. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-42.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 334. As in Bakke, the Court emphasized that universities cannot "insulate
applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for
admission." Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 335-36 (explaining that some attention to numbers is permissible in order to
attain a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities). Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, disagreed with the majority arguing that
"[s]tripped of its 'critical mass' veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort
to achieve racial balancing." Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice
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applicants flexibly considered "a wide variety of characteristics besides
race and ethnicity" when selecting a diverse student body.8 2  In the
Court's view, such individualized review also mitigated any possible
harm to non-minority applicants.83 The Court further found that the
university adequately considered race-neutral alternatives. 8 Finally, the
Court accepted the university's pledge that it would continue to seek a
race-neutral admissions plan so as to limit the duration of the current
plan.85
2. The Development of Strict Scrutiny of Race-Based Classifications in
Government Contracting and Employment
Between Bakke and the Michigan cases, the Supreme Court tackled
several key cases addressing affirmative action policies in government
contracting and employment.86 These cases have helped shaped the
manner in which courts apply strict scrutiny in other contexts related to
affirmative action, including those concerning race-based policies in K-12
87settings .
In a key employment case decided in 1987, United States v. Paradise,8s
the Court upheld a district court ruling ordering the Alabama
Department of Public Safety to implement an affirmative action programfor tatepatrl • 89
for state patrol promotions. The Court recognized that the state had a
compelling interest in remedying the prior exclusion of Blacks from
expressed concern with the fact that the percentage of minority students admitted by the
law school varied very little from the overall percentages in the applicant pool, giving the
appcarance that the admissions program was "in practice, a carefully managed program
designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants from selected minority
groups." Id. at 384-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 336-40.
83. Id. at 341.
84. Id. at 339-40 (noting that the university was not required to exhaust all possible
race-neutral alternative and that it undertook "serious, good faith consideration" of such
alternatives).
85. Id. at 343.
86. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
87. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (citing Adarand as a framework for strict
scrutiny); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706-07 (4th Cir. 1999)
(applying the narrow-tailoring factors of Paradise to a K-12 setting).
88. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
89. Id. at 185 (plurality opinion). In 1972 the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama found that the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department)
had systematically excluded Blacks from employment. Id. at 153 (plurality opinion).
Eleven years later, after the Department failed to develop adequate promotion
procedures, the Court imposed a fifty percent promotional quota for available Black
candidates as long as the Department remained less than twenty-five percent Black and
had not developed an appropriate promotional plan. Id. at 163 (plurality opinion).
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
employment positions.9 The Court determined that when evaluating
"whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate" it must consider "the
necessity for the relief and . . . alternative remedies; the flexibility and
duration of the relief . . . ; the relationship of the numerical goals to the
relevant market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties. ' '"l Despite the fact that Paradise was a remedial case and did not
involve affirmative action to achieve diversity, these factors have since
guided the narrow tailoring analysis of many courts when evaluating
voluntary desegregation programs in the K-12 context.
92
Two years following Paradise, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,93 the Supreme Court grappled with a Richmond, Virginia plan
designed to remedy past discrimination.94 The city's plan required prime
contractors to award at least thirty percent of construction subcontracts
to minority businesses. 5 In Croson, the Court defined the purpose of
strict scrutiny, explaining that "the means chosen [must] 'fit' [the]
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification [is] illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype."96 Holding that strict scrutiny applies to all laws that create
classifications, 97 the Court went on to strike down the plan for lacking a
compelling state interest.98
The Court revisited the issue of affirmative action in 1995 in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.9  Adarand, a subcontractor on highway
projects, challenged the Department of Transportation's policy of
providing financial incentives to prime contractors who hired "'socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals"' as subcontractors.t °  The
90. Id. at 167 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 171 (plurality opinion).
92, See, e.g., Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706; Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 130-33 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Id. at 478. The city determined that low minority participation in the city's
construction contracts was based on discrimination despite a lack of direct evidence that
the city or its prime contractors had ever discriminated against minority-owncd
subcontractors. Id. at 479-80.
95. Id. at 477. The plan defined minority businesses as those that were owned and
controlled by at least fifty-one percent minority group members. Id. at 478.
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id. at 493-94.
98. Id. at 505 (finding that the city did not demonstrate adequate need for remedial
action). Specifically, the Court found that remedying the present effects of past
discrimination did not represent a compelling government interest. Id. at 499.
99. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
100. Id. at 205-06. Adarand specifically pointed to the fact that it had the low bid
which would have been accepted if the prime contractor had not received additional
payment for hiring a minority subcontractor. Id. at 205-06.
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lower courts had applied an intermediate standard of review in granting
the defendant's summary judgment.' The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, declaring that "all racial classifications ... must be analyzed by
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."'' 2 The Court also acknowledged
that the "fundamental purpose" of strict scrutiny requires that the court
take "'relative differences' into account,"'0 3 emphasizing that strict
scrutiny does not foreclose governments from taking race-based
actions.'('4
D. Challenges to Voluntary Integration Plans in K-12 Settings
1. Pre-Grutter and Gratz Cases
The Second Circuit most recently addressed the use of race in a
student assignment plan in Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School
District.'0 5 In Brewer, the district participated in a voluntary interdistrict
transfer plan with the Rochester School District."° The goal was to
reduce the racial isolation resulting from segregated housing patterns in
urban Rochester."" The court noted that only minority pupils were
allowed to transfer from "predominantly minority city schools" to
participating suburban schools. 108
In Brewer, the court held that the district's goal of reducing racial
isolation to ameliorate de facto segregation resulting from housing
patterns was a compelling interest' °9 As support for its holding, the court
cited previous decisions within the circuit upholding race-based policies
designed to foster integration as well as support from the Supreme
101. Id. at 237 (explaining that the court of appeals found the government's program
to be narrowly tailored to a significant government purpose rather than applying the more
stringent compelling interest standard).
102. Id. at 227 (emphasis added). The Court went on to remand the case to the court
of appeals for determination under the appropriate standard of review. Id. at 237.
103. Id. at 228.
104. See id. at 237.
105. 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
106. See id. at 741-43. The district, a suburb or Rochester, voluntarily participates in
the program along with five other suburban districts. Id.
107. See id. at 742.
108. Id. In addition, the court observed that "non-minority students [could] transfer
from suburban schools to city schools provided that their transfers '[did] not negatively
affect the racial balance of the receiving school."' Id.
109. Id. at 752.
110. See id. at 749-50; Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach (Andrew
Jackson II), 738 F.2d 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1984) ("'[T]o promote a more lasting integration is
a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify as a matter of law excluding some minority
students from schools of their choice."' (quoting Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High
Sch. v. Ambach (Andrew Jackson 1), 598 F.2d 705, 719 (2d Cir. 1979)); Andrew Jackson 1,
2005]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:961
Court's desegregation jurisprudence."' After concluding that the state
demonstrated a compelling interest, the court went on to find that "[i]f
reducing racial isolation is ... a constitutionally permissible goal ... then
there is no more effective means of achieving that goal than to base
decisions on race."'12
Prior to Brewer, the Fourth Circuit in 1999 addressed the use of race-
based policies in two cases concerning admission policies related to
specialized programs available to all students.' 3 Without the benefit of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz, the court looked to
Bakke and Paradise for guidance."4 In both cases, the court struck down
the district's admissions policy on narrow tailoring grounds.15
In Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 6 the Fourth Circuit
considered a challenge to a school district's admission policy used for
three specialized schools designed to "teach students in a 'traditional'
format." 7  Initially, the admissions policy allowed unrestricted
applications to the schools, but implemented a weighted lottery, which
included diversity as a factor, when schools became oversubscribed.
598 F.2d at 717-21 (holding that as a matter of law the sate has a compelling interest in
ensuring school's are integrated). These cases involved a New York City school which saw
its minority enrollment soar from eighteen percent to over ninety-nine percent in a
twenty-year period. Andrew Jackson 1!, 738 F.2d at 576. In an attempt to stem the tide of
segregation, the district initiated a plan that permitted minority student transfers to other
schools so long as the White enrollment at the receiving school was above a fifty percent
"tipping point" that the district believed would trigger resegregation. See id. at 576-77. In
addition, the plan limited transfers to those that would not decrease the receiving school's
racial balance by more than four percent in a year. Id. at 577. Although the court
recognized reducing racial isolation as a compelling interest in both cases, it did not reach
a definitive ruling and remanded both cases to determine whether specific aspects of the
plan were necessary. See id. at 583; Andrew Jackson 1, 598 F.2d at 720-21.
111. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 750.
112. Id. at 752. The court distinguished the district's goal of addressing racial isolation
from the goal of attaining "true diversity." Id. at 752-53. The court asserted that cases
involving a more broadly defined goal of "true diversity" were not applicable to instances
where a program's goal was to ameliorate racial isolation. Id.
113. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 700-01, 706 (4th Cir. 1999);
Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 130-35 (4th
Cir. 1999).
114. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 133.
115. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 133.
116. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
117. Id. at 700-01. These schools operated as an alternative to neighborhood schools
and availability was limited. Id. The policy was designed "'to prepare and educate
students to live in a diverse, global society' by 'reflect[ing] the diversity of the
community."' Id. (alteration in orginal).
118. See id. at 701-02. Under the admissions plan, students with siblings already
attending the school were offered admission. Id. at 702. If the applicant pool failed to
match the district's diversity factors to within fifteen percent of the county population
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Without deciding the issue, the Tuttle court assumed that the state had
a compelling interest and instead focused its attention on narrow
tailoring." 9 Applying the factors from Paradise, the court held that the
weighted lottery was not narrowly tailored.2 " The court again focused on
numerical relationships, interpreting the lottery as a means for the
district to achieve racial balance proportional to the district average, and
holding that the policy resulted in impermissible racial balancing.'
21
The Fourth Circuit also confronted admission to a specialized program
in Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools, considering the
district's policy on transfers to magnet schools. 122  Under the plan,
students were assigned to a neighborhood school but could voluntarily
request transfer to a magnet program.2 3 Diversity was one factor the
district used in approving transfers. 2 4 The parents of a White student
percentages, the weighted lottery was used. Id. The diversity factors used were "(1)
whether the applicant was from a low-income or special family background, (2) whether
English was the applicant's first or second language, and (3) the racial or ethnic group to
which the applicant belonged." Id. at 701. The lottery was structured so the
underrepresented groups had an increased probability of admission. Id.
119. See id. at 705 (stating that "[u]ntil the Supreme Court provides decisive guidance,
we will assume . . . that diversity may be a compelling governmental interest"). Notably,
both Eisenberg and Tuttle were decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Michigan affirmative action cases. Arguably, the Fourth Circuit would have considered
the Michigan decisions as decisive guidance on whether diversity could be a compelling
interest. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at
*4-5 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (holding diversity to be a compelling interest in a K-12 setting
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
120. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706-07.
121. Id. As explanation, the court stated:
Although the Policy does not explicitly set aside spots solely for certain
minorities, it has practically the same result by skewing the odds of selection in
favor or certain minorities. Even if the final results may have some statistical
variation, what drives the entire weighted lottery process.., is racial balancing.
Id. at 707. In addition to finding the policy to be racial balancing, the court also found that
the district had not adequately considered race-neutral alternatives, that the policy was
not flexible enough, and that the burden on third parties was too great. Id. at 706-07.
122. Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 124-
25 (4th Cir. 1999). The court described magnet schools as those schools "offering enriched
curricula emphasizing specific areas; e.g., science, math, or a foreign language." Id. at 125
n.3.
123. See id. at 125.
124. See id. at 126-27. The transfer policy specified that "[t]ransfers that negatively
affect diversity are usually denied." Id. at 126. In implementing the plan, the county
assigned each racial/ethnic group within a school a category. Id. at 126-27. Category one
included groups whose percentage was higher than the countywide percentage and
continued to increase over time. Id. at 126. Transfers typically were not allowed. Id.
Category two included groups whose percentages were higher than the county average but
had been declining. Id. Some transfers were permitted. Id. Category three included
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challenged the policy when their child was denied admission to a district
magnet school under the diversity policy.
25
Finding the transfer program outside the scope of the narrowly
tailored analysis, the court struck down the policy. 126  Because the
program was "administered with an end toward maintaining. .. [a] racial
balance in each school" and was equivalent to the percentage of each
race throughout the entire system,'27 the court declared it to be "by
definition, racial balancing.', 128  As in Tuttle, the court did not reach a
decision on whether the state had a compelling interest.
29
In a 1998 case, Wessman v. Gittens,"3 the First Circuit addressed a high
school admissions program distinctly different from magnet school
programs and more analogous to the higher education context.' Much
like the Michigan cases, the program in Wessman involved selective
admission to a prestigious, highly competitive school. 3 2 In determining
admission, half of the positions were allocated based on applicants'
133composite scores determined by grade point average and test scores.
The other half were allocated based on racial and ethnic guidelines. 34
Evaluating the program under strict scrutiny, the First Circuit found
the plan was not justified on the basis of diversity or as a means of
remedying past discrimination. The court did not decide whether
diversity could serve as a compelling interest, but assumed that Bakke
controlled and that some forms of diversity could be sufficiently
groups below the county average which had tended to decline over time. Id. Category
four included groups below the county average which had tended to increase. Id. at 127.
125. See id. at 124. Specifically, the district denied the student's transfer request
because his assigned school had a declining White enrollment that was significantly below
the district average, and his transfer would have contributed to the school becoming more
racially isolated. Id. at 127.
126. See id. at 131, 133.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The district advanced two interests: diversity and reducing racial isolation. Id.
at 129. The court saw these interests as "one and the same." Id. at 130. Without deciding,
the court assumed that "diversity may be a compelling governmental interest." td.
130. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
131. Compare Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 793 (considering merit-based criteria), with
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 244, 255 (2003) (involving an undergraduate admissions plan
that used merit-based criteria as a factor).
132. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 791. The school involved in this case, the Boston Latin
School, was one of three "examination" schools operated by the city of Boston. Id.
133. Id. at 793.
134. Id. In applying these guidelines, officials first determined the proportions of five
different categories within the remaining pool of qualified applicants. Id. The remaining
positions were then filled in rank order, but the number of students taken had to match
the proportion within the remaining pool of qualified applicants. Id.
135. Id. at 800.
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compelling.16 In striking down the plan, however, the court found that
the district's use of diversity as a rationale for its admissions policies was
merely a pretext for racial balancing.'
2. Post-Grutter and Gratz Cases
Recently, the First and Ninth Circuits confronted two cases related to
general student assignment plans in K-12 education."" Applying the
standards the Supreme Court enunciated in Grutter and Gratz, both
courts recognized diversity as a compelling interest.'39 However, both
courts also struck down the plans after applying the narrow tailoring
guidelines the Court outlined in Grutter.40 Exemplifying the volatility of
this issue, each circuit has since vacated its original decision and granted
a rehearing en banc. 14' The First Circuit heard arguments on February 7,
2005,14' and the Ninth Circuit is expected to address the issue by the
middle of 2005.143
The First Circuit confronted the issue of voluntary K-12 student
assignment policies in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee,'44 invalidating
the student transfer program of the Lynn School District in
136. Id. at 796 ("[W]e assume arguendo-but we do not decide today-that Bakke
remains good law and that some iterations of 'diversity' might be sufficiently compelling
... to justify race-conscious actions.").
137. Id. at 798. Commenting on the plan's use of racial and ethnic guidelines, the
court stated:
Although Justice Powell endorsed diversity as potentially comprising a
compelling interest, he warned that a proper admissions policy would be such
that if an applicant "loses out" to another candidate, he will "not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the
right color or had the wrong surname."
Id. at 800 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978)).
138. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (1st
Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662
(1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and rehg en banc granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005).
139. Comfort, No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *31; Parents Involved in
Cnty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 964.
140. Comfort, No. 03-2415, U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *61; Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch., 377 F.3d at 969-70.
141. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 395 F.3d at 1168; Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
24662, at *1.
142. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662, at *1.
143. See Linda Shaw, School Battle To Get Another Hearing; Racial Tiebreaker in
Seattle is Issue-2nd Appeals Court Panel To Hear Case, SEATtLE TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at
B1, LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File.
144. No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and
reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
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Massachusetts. 45  Under the Lynn plan, each student was entitled to
attend his or her neighborhood school. 46 Students could transfer beyond
their neighborhood school if the transfer assisted the district's
desegregation efforts or if the transfer had a neutral effect.1
47
Acknowledging that the Lynn plan "aspire[d] to create many of the same
benefits that were cited approvingly by the Grutter Court," the court
recognized diversity as a compelling interest in a K-12 setting.' 4
However, the First Circuit disagreed with the district court on the matter
of narrow tailoring, finding that the plan did not conform to the
guidelines set forth in Grutter.
149
Applying the Grutter factors, the First Circuit focused much of its
attention on the Court's requirement that university admissions
programs avoid quotas and be flexible and non-mechanical in nature. 50
145. Comfort, No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *3-6. The State of
Massachusetts has since petitioned the First Circuit for an en banc review of the decision.
State Appeals Lynn Schools Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2004, at B2, LEXIS, News
Library, Bglobe File. Both parties to the case believe that the case is likely headed to the
Supreme Court. Anand Vaishnav, Court Eyes Race in School Assigning: Lynn Families
Sue for Choice, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2004, at B1, LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
It is worth noting that prior to implementation of the Lynn plan, the district was beset by
racial tension. Appellees Brief at 9-11, Comfort (No. 03-2415). Most schools were
predominately White, and those with high minority enrollments offered inferior
educational opportunities. Id. at 10. After the plan was implemented, the district realized
improved racial relations and academic performance. Id.
146. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *9.
147. Id. at *10-11. To provide a framework for considering whether a transfer assisted
desegregation, schools were classified as racially balanced, racially isolated, or racially
imbalanced. Id. A school was racially balanced if its minority enrollment was within a set
percentage of the overall minority enrollment in the district (fifteen percent for
elementary schools and ten percent for middle and high schools). Id. at *10. If the
minority enrollment exceeded this range, the school was considered racially imbalanced.
Id. at *10-11. If the number of White students fell below the target range, a school was
considered racially isolated. Id. at *10. Transfers were deemed to assist desegregation if
they improved the racial balance of the sending or receiving school. Id. at *11. Transfers
were not allowed when they negatively affected a racial imbalance at the sending or
receiving school. Id.
148. Id. at *42. Although the school district asserted separate interests of diversity and
avoiding racial isolation, the court analyzed the interests as one, stating that "[w]hether
stated as achieving the benefits of intergroup contact and critical mass or avoiding the
pitfalls of racial isolation, the central idea is that students-all students-are better off in
racially diverse schools." Id. at *37.
149. Id. at *43-45. In evaluating whether the Lynn plan was narrowly tailored, the
court referred to the Paradise factors as a broad formulation of the narrow-tailoring
requirement before turning to Grutter and Gratz. Id. at *43-44. Acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on race-based policies in K-12 settings, the First Circuit
asserted that the Michigan cases "furnish some relevant guideposts for how the narrow-
tailoring inquiry should function ... in the K-12 setting." Id. at *44-45.
150. Id. at *50.
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The court recognized that K-12 settings provide a different context than
university admissions, acknowledging that the race-based provisions of
the Lynn plan "neither skew a competitive process nor substitute race as
a proxy for an applicant's merit.""' Although the court stated that the
Lynn plan did not constitute a "pure quota system" and the "question
[was] close,' 52 it found that the Lynn plan was excessively mechanical
because it did not provide for individualized consideration and made
race the decisive factor in determining transfers.'53
The First Circuit also evaluated the Lynn plan on the other Grutter
factors.154 Analyzing the undue burden factor, the court found the plan's
focus on proportional representation went beyond what was necessary to
achieve "a critical mass" of minority students and therefore constituted
an undue burden.'55 The court also found that despite considering a
number of race-neutral alternatives, the district failed adequately to
consider policies geared toward proportionality and not attaining a
"critical mass."'5 6 In addition, the court found that there were inadequate
measures in place for periodic review of the plan so as to limit its
duration.'57
The Ninth Circuit confronted similar issues in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 115" A group of parents
151. Id. at *49.
152. Id. at *50-51.
153. Id. The court indicated that the Lynn plan's use of race could "foster the
unwarranted presumption that that all members of a given racial group present the same
viewpoint" and "breed cross-racial tension." Id. at *50. In determining that the plan was
overly mechanical in nature, the court stated that it included "no individualized
consideration of a student's qualifications, no head-to-head comparison of one student to
another, and no weight given to a student's other potential contributions to diversity." Id.
at *47.
154. Id. at *51-62.
155. Id. at *51-56. The court cited expert testimony indicating that "critical mass"
required approximately twenty percent of a given group as compared with the Lynn plan's
range that would require a higher percentage. Id. at *54-55. The district contended that
the benefits of diversity increased the closer a school's racial balance is to the racial
composition of the community. Id. at *53. However, the court found that the plan went
too far and thus became an excessive burden on those students denied transfers. Id. at
*53-55.
156. Id. at *52-53. The court listed six alternatives that the district considered, finding
the efforts "laudable." Id. at *56-58. However, the court determined that because the
district only considered alternatives that would result in racial proportions in excess of the
critical mass of approximately twenty percent indicated by the district's expert, the
consideration of race-neutral alternatives was geared toward the wrong goal. Id. at *58.
157. Id. at *60-61. Although the district continually monitored demographic data and
adjusted its plan accordingly, the court took issue with the lack of a periodic review to
determine whether the program remained necessary. Id.
158. 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (2-1 decision).
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challenged the Seattle School District's use of race as a tiebreaker in its
high school assignment plan.'59 Due to Seattle's racially-segregated
housing patterns,16 the district adopted an open choice plan rather than
assigning students to neighborhood schools. 161  Where more students
wanted to attend a particular school than space was available, the district
implemented a series of tiebreakers, one of which was a "racial
integration tiebreaker" that took race into account.1
6
1
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the district had established
a compelling interest in diversity, 163 the court determined that the use of
race was not narrowly tailored to further that interest.'9 Applying the
narrow tailoring analysis of Grutter, the court found the plan was
"virtually indistinguishable from a pure racial quota" because it used a
computer program to determine a percentage range with "both a floor
and a ceiling.', 165 In addition, the court found that the district did not
adequately consider race-neutral alternatives' 66 and that the tiebreaker
adversely affected third parties.
67
159. Id. at 956-57.
160. Id. at 954 n.4 (indicating that Seattle's minority population is concentrated in the
southern half of the city, while nearly seventy percent of the White population lives in the
northern half of the city).
161. Id. at 955. The plan allowed students to select from any of the ten high schools in
the district. Id. Students ranked the high schools in order of preference and the district
attempted to assign students to the highest ranked school with available space. Id.
162. Id. When space became an issue at a school it was considered "oversubscribed."
Id. In the tiebreaker system, preference was first given to students with siblings already
attending the requested school. Id. The second tiebreaker was an "integration
tiebreaker" determined by whether the student's race would correct racial imbalance in
the school. Brief of Appellees at 11-12, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (No. 01-35450),
available at 2001 WL 34090888. This tiebreaker became a factor where the school's
enrollment was plus or minus fifteen percent of the district's overall racial demographic of
sixty percent minority students and forty percent White students. Id. at 3-4. For instance,
if a school had fewer than forty-five percent minority students and more than fifty-five
percent White, minority students were assigned ahead of White students. Id. at 4. If a
school had fewer than twenty-five percent White students and more than seventy percent
minority students, White students were assigned ahead of minority students. Id. Once a
school fell within the acceptable range for being racially balanced, the next tiebreaker,
distance from the student's home to school, was applied. Id. at 12.
163. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 963-64 (recognizing that the district's
interests related to diversity, and reducing racial isolation fell "comfortably within the
diversity rationale" of Grutter).
164. Id. at 969.
165. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 969.
166. Id. at 970-75 (asserting that although the school district did examine alternatives,
it did not earnestly consider several options). Contra Brief of Appellees at 60-61, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. (No. 01-35450), available at 2001 WL 3409088 (asserting that race-
neutral alternatives examined by the school board would have defeated the central goals
of the school assignment plan). The dissent in this case asserted that all alternatives were
seriously considered but rejected for legitimate reasons, stating that "[w]hen race is a
2005] Race as a Factor in K-12 Student Assignment Plans
In addition to the First and Ninth Circuits, a district court in Kentucky
recently applied the Grutter standards to a student assignment plan using
race as a factor.6s In McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools,'69
the court addressed a voluntary integration plan implemented after the
district had been released from a court-ordered desegregation plan."
7 As
a central component, the Jefferson County plan required that schools
seek a broad range of Black student enrollment between fifteen and fifty
percent. '7  Other factors, including place of residence, program
popularity, and school capacity were considered prior to any
consideration of race; however, where the racial composition of a school
was at either end of the range, race could determine a child's school
assignment. 
72
After finding that the district established a compelling interest, 173 the
McFarland court examined each of the Grutter narrow-tailoring factors
and upheld the Jefferson County plan. 174 Holding that the plan did not
constitute a quota,'75 the court distinguished the school district from the
law school, downplaying the need for individualized review since the
principal element of the government's compelling interest, then race-neutral alternatives
seldom will be equally efficient." Parents Involved in Cmey. Sch., 377 F.3d at 1008-10
(Graber, J., dissenting).
167. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 975 (arguing that the district was
presented with evidence that it could have expanded the diversity band without sacrificing
the benefits of diversity).
168. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 848-49 (W.D. Ky.
2004).
169. 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
170. Id. at 836. The Sixth Circuit initially ordered the district court to formulate a
desegregation plan in 1973. Id. at 841. In 2000, a Kentucky district court dissolved the
desegregation decree and ordered the district to end the use of racial quotas and
reevaluate its admissions procedures for its magnet schools. Hampton v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ, 102 F. Supp. 2d 358,382 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
171. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (reflecting a range above and below the racial
composition of the entire district).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 850 ("[T]he Court has no doubt that Defendants have proven that their
interest in having integrated schools is compelling by any definition.").
174. Id. at 856-61. Although the court approved the district's overall student
assignment plan, it did invalidate a subset of the plan which applied to the district's
"traditional schools." Id. at 862-64 (holding that the plan was not narrowly tailored
because of its use of separate assignment tracks and enrollment lists that made race a
defining feature of a student's application). The results of Jefferson County's integration
plan have been positive, with over ninety percent of high school juniors in the district
reporting that they were comfortable working with students of other races. See
FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 13.
175. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d. at 857-58.
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district's plan did not involve competition and comparative criteria."'
Considering the undue harm factor of Grutter, the court again
distinguished the public school setting from higher education, pointing
out that "the consequences of assigning students to various public
schools are quite different from denying an applicant admission to a
selective college or job placement. '177  In reaching its decision, the
McFarland court approached the issues differently from the First and
Ninth Circuits, viewing voluntary integration plans as an extension of the•178
Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence and accepting the
promise of Brown as a key value of the American educational system."'
II. THE CHALLENGE OF STRICT SCRUTINY IN K-12 SETTINGS
A. Standard of Review for Race-Based Classifications
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the use of race-based
policies in the K-12 context, much remains unsettled.18  Nevertheless, the
standard of review is clear: any racial classification will merit strict
scrutiny. 8 Although some civil rights advocates and at least one district
court have suggested an intermediate level of review in the K-12
context,n lower courts have generally followed the Supreme Court's
guidance in their decisions on race-based policies in public schools .
3
176. Id. at 858-59 (finding that the use of race in the plan constituted a permissible
"tipping factor" in determining student assignments). The court explained:
Unlike the law school, JCPS does not deny anyone the benefits of an education.
Unlike the law school, JCPS does not have the goal of creating elite and highly
selective school communities .. . [and] does not involve weighing comparative
criteria in a competitive manner. Rather than excluding applicants, the Board's
goal is to create more equal school communities for educating all students.
Id. at 859.
177. Id. at 860.
178. Id. at 851.
179. Id. at 852 ("Brown's original moral and constitutional declaration has survived to
become a mainstream value of American education and [interests in integrated schools]
are entirely consistent with these . . . values. They reinforce our intuitive sense that
education is about a lot more than just the 'three Rs."').
180. See Suzanne E. Eckes, How Will the Grutter and Gratz Affirmative Action
Decisions Impact K-12 Diversity Plans?, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 16 (2003) ("[Ulntil
we have a Supreme Court decision specifically addressing the K-12 arena, the
constitutionality of race-conscious transfers and admissions decisions in grade schools will
remain uncertain.").
181. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that "all 'governmental
action based on race .. . should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry' (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))).
182. See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 366 (D.
Mass 2003) ("[A]lthough I am convinced by amici that intermediate scrutiny is the correct
test to apply here, my analysis below will apply the more rigorous standard."), affd in part
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Despite the strong likelihood of a strict scrutiny standard of review,
school districts are not foreclosed from using race as a factor. The
Court has stated that strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact,"'85 and is intended "to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant the use of a highly suspect tool.' ' 6 Strict scrutiny entails a
careful and flexible analysis that takes "relevant differences into
account" and allows race-based policies when sufficiently justified.
7 Just
as the University of Michigan Law School's policies overcame strict
scrutiny, K-12 public schools have a strong basis on which to pass strict
scrutiny as well."8
At issue remains how, after Grutter, courts should apply strict scrutiny
in K-12 settings. '89 What state interests are compelling?' ° What factors
must courts consider in determining whether policies are narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest?'9 ' These questions are at
the forefront of the developing controversy related to student
assignments in the K-12 context.
and rev'd in part sub nom. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21791 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004); see also Amended Brief of Amici Curiae at 7-
8, Comfort ex rel. v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 99-CV-
11811 NG) ("While it is true that courts ... use sweeping language to suggest that any
consideration of race by a governmental actor must satisfy strict scrutiny . . . this standard
is in fact not as broadly applicable.").
183. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949,
960 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005);
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
184. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 ("When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also
satisfied.").
185. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
186. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 493 (1989). The Court
reiterated this sentiment in Grutter, stating: "Not every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental
decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
187. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228.
188. See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 859-62 (acknowledging the contextual
distinctions between higher education and K-12 settings in upholding the district's student
assignment plan).
189. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 755 (2004)
(explaining that Grutter leaves open the question of whether race-conscious policies are
permissible in K-12 settings).
190. See discussion infra Part II.B.
191. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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B. Compelling State Interests in K-12 Public Schools: Extending the
Scope of the Higher Education Diversity Interest
The Michigan affirmative action cases bring much needed clarity to the
question of what interests may be compelling. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Grutter, lower courts were reluctant to fully endorse
diversity as a compelling state interest."' The Fifth Circuit went so far as
to claim past discrimination was the only rationale for using racial• "r' • 93
classifications. Until the ample clarification in the Grutter decision,
lower courts remained reluctant to support diversity as a compelling state
interest due to the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court after
Bakke. 19 4 After the Court acknowledged diversity as a compelling state
interest, lower courts began to embrace diversity as a compelling state
interest in higher education admissions. '95
While Grutter focused on higher education, its central principles are
transferable to the K-12 context. 116  By relying on K-12 decisions,
including Brown, Grutter exemplifies the validity of a diversity interest in
public elementary and secondary schools."" Recent federal court
decisions have supported an extension of Grutter to K-12 situations. ' " In
Parents Involved in Community Schools, the Ninth Circuit strongly
backed an extension of the Court's higher education diversity rationale
to the K-12 context, stating that "Grutter plainly accepts that
constitutionally compelling internal educational and external societal
benefits flow from the presence of racial and ethnic diversity in
192. See discussion supra notes 119, 129, 136 and accompanying text.
193. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996).
194. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) ("[W]e endorse Justice Powell's
view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest .... ").
195. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949,
963-64 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.
2005); Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 2003); McFarland v.
Jefferson City Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d, 834, 852-53 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
196. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 964 ("[W]e cannot identify a
principled basis for concluding that the benefits the Court attributed to the existence of
educational diversity in universities cannot similarly attach in high schools.").
197. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 ("This Court has long recognized that 'education ... is
the very foundation of good citizenship."' (omission in original) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1958))). The Court added, "We have repeatedly acknowledged
the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing
education as pivotal to 'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of society." Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982)).
198. See, e.g., McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (finding that "the benefits of racial
tolerance and understanding are equally as 'important and laudable' in public elementary
and secondary education as in higher education" (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330)).
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educational institutions."'99 In addition, the First Circuit recognized an
extension of a diversity interest to K-12 settings with its decision in
Comfort.
20
While the diversity interest outlined by the Grutter Court transfers to
the K-12 context,2°I the nature of K-12 settings is quite different from
other contexts.2 2 A key goal of diversity in higher education is attaining
a variety of viewpoints. However, in the K-12 context, the diversity
interest extends well beyond providing a stimulating academic
environment. It encompasses broader goals of exposing children to
"interaction with peers of other races,"2 04 which the Court has accepted
as well within the domain of public schools. Such interaction helps
schools "cultivate positive racial attitudes and teach children how to
think critically so that they can live and work in increasingly diverse
199. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 964.
200. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *40
(1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) ("There is no reason to believe that [diversity] interests are
substantially more potent in the context of higher education than in the context of
elementary and secondary education."), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
201. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 964 (acknowledging diversity
as a compelling interest in the high school context); see also David I. Levine, Public School
Assignment Methods After Grutter and Gratz: The View From San Francisco, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 515-16 (2003) ("In all probability, a public elementary and
secondary school district will have little trouble asserting a compelling governmental
interest in a diverse student body under the Grutter and Gratz opinions.").
202. See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 381 n.90
(D. Mass. 2003) ("The value of a diverse classroom setting.., does not inhere in the range
of perspectives and experience that students can offer in discussions; rather, diversity is
valuable because it enables students to learn racial tolerance by building cross-racial
relationships."), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No.
03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en
banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
203. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (acknowledging a university's
interest in selecting students who will contribute to "the robust exchange of ideas" crucial
to its mission).
204. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 993 (Graber, J., dissenting); see
also Comfort ex rel. Neumyer, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 376-77 ("If the compelling goal ... is to
train citizens to function in a multiracial world, actual intergroup racial contact is
essential."). Research studies have demonstrated the benefits of cross-racial interaction
on racial stereotypes. See Brief of the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University as
Amicus Curiae at 16, Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (No. 03-2415).
205. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (indicating that
the purpose of public schools is to "'inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation"' (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968))); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
76-77 (1979) (observing that one of the objectives of public education is "inculcating
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system").
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communities."2'0 Furthermore, the need for exposure to other races is
more urgent in elementary and secondary schools, as the benefits of
207cross-racial interaction are most profound at younger ages.
These differences highlight the need for a broader diversity interest in
208K-12 settings than in higher education contexts. Several courts have
206. Brief of Amici Curiae for the Council of the Great City Schools et al. in Support
of Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Appellees at 9. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (No.
01-35450). See generally Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government
Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 950-54 (2002) (providing
an overview of research on the benefits of cross-racial interaction in elementary and
secondary schools).
207. See Susanne E. Dutton et al., Racial Identity of Children in Integrated,
Predominately White, and Black Schools, 138 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 41, 42 (1998). Research
indicates that "[t]he early school years are crucial for the formation of the child's own
racial identity as well as an understanding of prejudice and fairness." Id. At between five
and eight years old children begin to form perceptions about their own identity and the
differences between themselves and others. Id. By the time children reach eight to twelve
years old, they begin to "internalize, to act upon, and, in turn, to perpetuate society's
expectations." Id. Social science studies also indicate that children in integrated schools
are more likely to choose opposite-race friends than are children in non-integrated
schools. Id. at 50. In addition, both White and Black students in non-integrated schools
are more likely to dislike persons of the opposite race than students in integrated schools.
Id.; cf Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his criticism of the need for
diversity in law schools, Justice Scalia stated:
For it is . . . essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it
cannot be 'taught' in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years
younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in
institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.
Id.
208. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 377 F.3d at 994 (Graber, J., dissenting). As the
dissent explained:
Universities ... are not ... responsible for the welfare of the entire universe of
their applicants .... Public school districts, on the other hand, must consider not
only the affirmative effect that a student's assignment to a particular school will
have on the level of diversity in that school, but also the concomitant effect of
that assignment on the entire school system.
Id. (Graber, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Graber went on to add that the Supreme
Court's desegregation cases support the concept that "school districts have a prospective,
even if not a remedial, interest in avoiding and ameliorating real, identifiable de facto
racial segregation." Id. at 995.
School districts cannot change racially segregated housing patterns, but they can
"shape educational environments that neutralize the effects of these patterns, to make
certain that [they] are not determinative of a child's opportunity." Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 384. Research has shown that de facto segregation is a
growing problem in America's schools. FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 2, at 27.
Research by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University indicates that
[wihile the public school enrollment reflects the country's growing diversity,
our analysis of the nation's large school districts indicates a disturbing pattern of
growing isolation. We find decreasing black and Latino exposure to white
students is occurring in almost every large district as well as declining white
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acknowledged the differences between higher education and K-12, but
have argued for a separate compelling interest of reducing racial
isolation.2°9 However, other courts have been reluctant to recognize a
separate compelling interest because the same concepts can be expressed
as an extension of the diversity interest rather than as a separate
concept.21°
Brown and its progeny support a broader diversity interest as viewed
through the lens of reducing racial isolation."' As the Second Circuit
explained in Brewer, the Supreme Court has provided "strong support"
for promoting a reduction in racial isolation..2" This support is evidenced
by the Court's statements in its desegregation cases indicating strong
deference to school board policies.23 Such statements, while not binding,
have "never been disclaimed by the Supreme Court.""' 4 It would make
exposure to blacks and Latinos in almost one-third of large districts. Black and
Latino students display high levels of segregation from white students in many
districts .... [E]ven when white students are only a small percentage of total
enrollment they tend to be concentrated in a few schools, which results in lower
exposure of black and Latino students to white students ...
Id.
209. E.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000)
(recognizing reducing racial isolation as a compelling interest); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer,
283 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (recognizing multiple compelling interests, including "promoting
... diversity, increasing educational opportunities for all students ... and ensuring student
safety" as well as remedying the effects of racial isolation).
210. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *35-
37 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (explaining that whether stated as reducing racial isolation or
attaining diversity, the central tenet remains that students are better off in a diverse
school), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov.
24, 2004).
211. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 750-51 (citing the Supreme Court's comments in support
of voluntary integration programs in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Washington v. School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)).
212. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 750-51. Further supporting a diversity interest that
incorporates reducing racial isolation, Congress has expressed support for voluntary
integration in the No Child Left Behind Act. In its findings authorizing the Magnet
Schools Assistance Program, Congress noted that "[i]t is in the best interests of the United
States ... [to] support . . . local educational agencies that are voluntarily seeking to foster
meaningful interaction among students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds." 20
U.S.C. § 7231(a)(4) (Supp. 2001). Congress added that the purpose of the program is "to
assist in the desegregation of schools ... by providing financial assistance to eligible local
educational agencies for ... the elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group
isolation in elementary schools and secondary schools with substantial proportions of
minority students." Id. § 7231(b)(1), (3).
213. See discussion supra Part I.B (describing the Supreme Court's indications of
approval for voluntary integration plans).
214. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 750.
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little sense that courts may order districts to remedy racial inequities in
schools if they could not also act independently of court mandates. 5
C. Finding the Right Approach to Narrow Tailoring
While Grutter helped clarify whether diversity can serve as a
compelling interest, the application of narrow tailoring to K-12 situations
appears far less certain.2 16 Where K-12 student assignment plans have
been struck down, courts have done so on the grounds that they were not
217narrowly tailored. While Grutter and Gratz provided guidelines for
narrow tailoring in higher education, the Court offered no indication of
how or if courts should apply them in the K-12 context.218
In striking down K-12 student assignment plans, courts have often
applied strict scrutiny more rigidly than the Supreme Court has indicated
they should.2 " The Supreme Court has maintained that narrow tailoring
"must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to
achieve student body diversity in public higher education, 220 and that
"[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action., 22' It
215. See, e.g., Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 384
(D. Mass. 2003) ("It would make no sense if officials were obliged to take responsibility
for addressing these adverse consequences but at the same time were constitutionally
barred from taking voluntary action."), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nora. Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004),
withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24,
2004); Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379-80 (W.D. Ky.
2000) ("It is incongruous that a federal court could at one moment require a school board
to use race to prevent resegregation of the system, and at the very next moment prohibit
that same policy.").
216. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at
*51 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (implying a need for guidance from the Supreme Court
regarding race-based policies in K-12 settings), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
217. See, e.g., id. at *43-45; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1,
377 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2005); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 707-08 (4th Cir. 1999);
Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir.
1999).
218. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
219. See Robinson II, supra note 10, at 69 (remarking that some courts have applied
narrow tailoring in an arbitrary and rigid manner).
220. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
221. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). The Court stated that "[n]ot every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a
framework for carefully examining the importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced
by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." Id.
(emphasis added).
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follows that courts must also apply an appropriately contextualized
22
approach when confronting race-based policies in K-12 education.
The Supreme Court focused on competition in the affirmative action
contexts; 223 however, competition is not present in K-12 student
assignment plans.224 Employment and contracting both involve a highly
selective process in which applicants compete for limited governmental
benefits based on set qualifications or standards.225 Likewise, in higher
education "[t]he Court's underlying concern is for fair competition-to
prevent race from being used as an outright substitute for merit in the
competition for access to a limited government resource., 226 In the K-12
context, such competition rarely exists. Only in Wessman, the elite
Boston high school with competitive, merit-based admissions, did a lower
court confront a situation in K-12 that is analogous to the competitive
nature of other contexts.
2 27
The lack of competition in K-12 settings most directly impacts the
Court's requirement in Grutter "that each applicant [must be] evaluated
,228
as an individual." In expressing this requirement, the Court relied
extensively on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke which discussed higher
education admissions in terms of competition based on an applicant's•-  229
qualifications. Because K-12 student assignment plans do not involve
merit-based competition in which students are directly compared with
222. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379-80 (W.D.
Ky. 2000) ("The workplace, marketplace, and higher education cases are poor models for
most elementary and secondary public school education precisely because they always
involve vertical choices-one person is hired, promoted, receives a valuable contract, or
gains admission.").
223. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-06 (1995)
(involving competitive bidding for subcontracting); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 153 (1987) (plurality opinion) (upholding a court-ordered remedial promotion
program where some higher-qualified White applicants were passed over to meet the
court's mandate). It is worth noting that Paradise involved a suit contesting a remedial
affirmative action program rather than the non-remedial situations to which the factors
have been applied. Id. at 167.
224. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at
*47 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (indicating that competition was absent in the Lynn School
District's transfer plan), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
225. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205 (involving a competitive bidding process used in
awarding government contracts); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 161 (describing the use of merit-
based eligibility rankings to determine police department promotions).
226. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 999 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005).
227. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 793 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing the use of
merit-based criteria for admission to an elite high school).
228. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
229. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:961
one another, the Court's asserted interest in avoiding preferred groups
insulated from competition is less compelling.230 Likewise, the Court's
argument that "preferential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success
without special protection" '2 3 does not apply where competition is
absent.232
The Grutter factors also require that any use of race cannot place an
undue burden on non-favored parties. 33 However, in the K-12 context,
234the impact is negligible due to the nature of school assignments.
Unlike the selection of students at an elite university or the awarding of a
government contract, school systems do not deny any students the
benefits of an education when they assign students to a school. 231 In most
K-12 situations the question "is not whether a given plaintiff will receive
a given limited benefit. . . to which he or she is entitled. Rather, it is
230. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. Arguably, there is competition for available
positions in magnet programs since the benefit is limited; however, such programs remain
distinguishable from higher education settings because they do not determine assignments
based on merit. See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch.,
197 F.3d 123, 125 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing how all interested students could apply to the
magnet school at issue which offered specialized instruction in math and science).
231. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
232. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at
*49 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (stating that the dangers of reinforcing stereotypes are "far less
ominous, if not altogether absent, in the K-12 setting"), withdrawn and reh'g en banc
granted. 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
233. See Gruner, 539 U.S. at 341.
234. See John Charles Boger, The New Legal Attack on Educational Diversity in
America's Elementary and Secondary Schools, in RIGHTS AT RISK: EQUALITY IN AN AGE
OF TERRORISM 43, 52 (Dianne M. Pich6 et al. eds., 2002) (describing how school districts
provide a system of common public schools that provide fungible benefits available to all
students), available at http://www.cccr.org/CCCRReport.pdf.
235. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 860 (W.D. Ky.
2004). The court explained:
The difference between the use of race in graduate school admissions and the
[district's] student assignment plan result from the vastly different concept of
each system. The law school admissions program excludes many applicants
because of its goal of creating an elite community. The [district's] policy of
creating communities of equal and integrated schools for everyone excludes no
one from those communities.
Id.; see also Boger, supra note 234 ("Access to second-grade teachers or fifth-grade
classrooms ... is not a scarce resource but a public good. Every child is sent to school; no
child is denied."). Boger states:
What public school students learn from each other when they arrive at school is
neither limited to, nor constrained by, the assignment plans that have brought
them together. Schools, principals, and teachers often mix together elementary
students for a variety of reasons: those with different academic strengths; boys
with girls; stronger readers with weaker- all to pursue valid educational goals.
Id. at 55.
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whether any student is entitled to a particular school assignment at all. 236
Schools have always retained the ability to assign students to individual
schools regardless of a student's preference.237
Courts have also consistently looked for whether or not the school
238considered race-neutral alternatives. When schools develop student
assignments, their goals are more closely intertwined with race than
other contexts. 39 Where racial diversity is clearly integral to the overall
goal, using race to achieve that goal creates the tight fit necessary in
narrow tailoring.24' However, as the First Circuit has explained, any
236. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 373 (D. Mass 2003), affd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en bane granted, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
237. See Zander III v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n (In re United States), 682
F.2d 147, 152 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Students have no indefeasible right to associate through
choice of school. Mandatory assignment to public schools based on place of residence or
other factors is clearly permissible."); Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason,
495 P.2d 657, 663 (Wash. 1972) ("We find no authority in law for the proposition that
parents have a vested right to send their children to, or that children have a vested right to
attend, any particular public school."). One author has described the nature of a school's
authority to assign students as such:
[T]he guarantee [of a student's preferred school] would be impractical. In
drafting attendance plans, school boards have always been free to deny parental
preference for any one of a hundred reasons .... And once a child is in a public
school, the parent cannot dictate what teacher he gets, what courses he takes,
what grades he receives, or what discipline he meets. Parental views are often
welcomed (or tolerated) by school authorities, but parental control over an
offspring's education has always been circumscribed.
WILKINSON III, supra note 33, at 109.
238. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) ("Narrow tailoring does
.. require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will
achieve the diversity the university seeks."). The Court added the caveat that "[n]arrow
tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative." Id.
239. See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 372. The court explained that
an important mission of K-12 schools, in addition to fostering academic
achievement, is the cultivation of social skills that enable students to function as
citizens in a complex and diverse world. If "narrow tailoring" is about "fit," the
creation of an integrated school environment is surely likely to be a better "fit"
relative to this goal than an integrated workplace is to a commercial setting.
Id.
240. See id. at 376 ("When a government's ends are fundamentally concerned with
race-and those ends are recognized as compelling-it is natural that race-conscious
means provide the 'snuggest fit' to those ends."); see also Robinson II, supra note 10, at
72-73. The author states:
IT]he Supreme Court is most concerned about illegitimate discrimination tactics
disguised as legitimate admissions programs. This danger is not present when a
local school board acts to remcdy clearly identifiable and obvious racial isolation
.... [C]ourts should be less concerned with applying rigid factors and more
concerned with determining whether a given program is a good "fit"-and there
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alternatives considered must correspond to permissible goals to meet this
test. 4'
Quotas and issues of racial proportionality have been major factors in
the narrow tailoring analysis of race-based policies.242 Although the
Supreme Court has demonstrated some flexibility regarding the
permissible use of numeric targets,2 3 it has steadfastly refused to allow
any policy resembling outright racial balancing.24 Instead, race-based
plans may only strive to attain a "critical mass" of preferred
individuals.245 In Comfort, the First Circuit was critical of the district's
goal of proportionality,2 6 especially in light of expert testimony
indicating that the benefits of diversity begin to accrue when the
percentage of minority or non-minority students reaches a "critical mass"
247of twenty percent. The First Circuit implied that had the plan been
tailored toward a critical mass rather than proportionality, this factor
2481
would not have been an issue.
The Fourth Circuit neglected to take account of the distinctions
between K-12 settings and other contexts when it struck down the
241programs in Tuttle and Eisenberg. Instead, the court relied on the
is no better "fit" to achieve an integration of the races .. than a program that
considers the race of the individual applicants.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
241. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *61-
62 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) (holding that consideration of race-neutral alternatives are
insufficient where they have been geared toward achieving impermissible racial
balancing), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cit.
Nov. 24, 2004).
242. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious
admissions program cannot use a quota system.").
243. Id. at 335 (explaining that quotas are a "fixed number or percentage which must
be attained, or which cannot be exceeded" while "a permissible goal ... require[s] only a
good-faith effort.. . to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself" (omissions and
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Local 28 of Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,495 (1986))).
244. See id. at 330 (describing measures designed to achieve a specified percentage of
minority students as "outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional");
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) ("Racial balance is not to be achieved for its
own sake.").
245. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
246. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *53-54 (explaining that the compelling
interest was "in attaining the educational benefits of a level of racial diversity
commensurate with critical mass ... not some other, more grandiose goal").
247. Id. at *52; see also Brief of Appellees, at 22-23, Comfort (No. 03-2415).
248. See Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *55 ("Using racial restrictions to
achieve benefits otherwise absent is one thing; using those restrictions to edge closer to
racial balance is quite another.").
249. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1252 (11th Cir.
2001) (accepting the Fourth Circuit's use of the Paradise factors in Eisenberg and Tuttle,
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Paradise factors from the employment context, failing to note any
differences between employment settings and public school student
assignments, most notably the absence of merit-based competition. 250
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit also failed to consider adequately the
differing circumstances between K-12 higher education settings when it
strictly adhered to the narrow tailoring guidelines of Grutter.25' Although
Grutter provides a more contextualized set of guidelines than the
Paradise factors employed by the First Circuit, they remain a step
removed from the K-12 context and therefore, a more appropriately
212
tailored standard is necessary.
Since Grutter and Gratz, the only courts to make a concerted effort to
contextualize narrow-tailoring analysis to take account of such
differences are the First Circuit in Comfort and the district court in
McFarland . The Comfort court acknowledged the Supreme Court's
"admonition that context matters" when it highlighted the lack of
competition in K-12 settings.2 4 However, it continued to adhere closely
to the Grutter factors in other respects, indicating that "[i]f there is to be
a retreat from the Supreme Court's blueprint, the Court itself must light
the way., 255  The McFarland court also highlighted the lack of merit-
but indicating that the factors must be "adjusted slightly" to take account of the unique
issues raised in the education context); see also Robinson II, supra note 10, at 70-71
(critiquing the Fourth Circuit's narrow-tailoring analysis in Tuttle).
250. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999); see also,
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinon).
251. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 998
(9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J.,dissenting) ("Because of the differences in setting, several of
the narrow-tailoring factors employed by the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz -and
by the majority in this case-have no logical relevance to the evaluation of secondary
school assignment plans like the District's.").
252. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-42, with Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706-07. Both
methods of analysis consider the availability of race-neutral alternatives, the impact on
third parties, the flexibility of the policy, and its planned duration. Grutter, 539 U.S. at
334-42; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706-07. The methods diverge in respect to numerical goals, with
Grutter focusing on avoiding quotas, 539 U.S. at 334-36, and Tuttle (employing the
Paradise factors) considering the proportionality of the policy to the interest involved, 195
F.3d at 706-07.
253. See Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *41-43 (explaining that some
factors present in higher education settings are absent in K-12 settings); McFarland v.
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 859-60 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (setting forth the
relevant differences between higher education and K-12 settings that impact how strict
scrutiny is applied).
254. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *48.
255. Id. at *51.
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based criteria, 6 but also observed that students have no constitutional
right to choose a particular school. 7
III. STRIVING FOR BALANCE: THE IDEALS OF BROWN AND THE
MODERN REALITIES OF STRICT SCRUTINY OF RACE-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Broadening the Concept of Diversity as a Compelling Interest
To accommodate the unique nature of public schools and the promise
of Brown, courts must adapt their analysis to the K-12 setting. 21 As a
starting point, courts must adopt a broader diversity interest than that
required in Grutter.59 Such an interest should recognize the need to
provide cross-racial interaction at a young age, so as to enable schools to
continue to be "the foundation[s] of good citizenship" envisioned by
260
Brown. In addition, courts should follow the lead of the Second Circuit
in Brewer by recognizing an expanded view of diversity that thoroughly
incorporates the entire array of interests related to reducing racial
isolation.26'
B. Adapting Narrow Tailoring to the K-12 Context
Courts must also apply more nuanced narrow tailoring guidelines so as
to recognize the unique context of public education.2 6 2 Grutter provides
some guidance; however, courts must further adapt its general
framework to the K-12 setting.16' Because the nature of the interests in
K-12 settings differ from other contexts and competition is absent, courts
should apply a more focused standard2 64
Admission to selective programs, such as the magnet school described
in Eisenberg, remain susceptible to challenge, as such programs involve
specialization that courts may construe as a more limited benefit than
256. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
257. Id. at 860.
258. See supra Part JI.B-C.
259. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 201-08.
260. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see discussion supra note 207 and
accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
262. See Kevin Brown, Equal Protection Challenges to the Use of Racial Classifications
To Promote Integrated Public Elementary and Secondary Student Enrollments, 34 AKRON
L. REV. 37, 64 (2000) (arguing that the special characteristics of public schools demand a
different analysis than other contexts).
263. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at
*44-45 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
264. See id. at *44.
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more generalized student assignment plans.265  Despite lacking the
competition inherent in higher education and the merit-based program
struck down in Wessman, courts may regard these programs as parallel to
the limited benefits protected in other contexts.
266
Generalized student assignment plans such as those in Comfort and
Parents Involved in Community Schools are even further removed from
higher education, government contracting, and employment contexts
than the cases involving magnet programs. 27 These plans offer access to
the same educational opportunities even when a student is not assigned
to his or her first choice. 26' Furthermore, they more closely align with the
265. Compare Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d
123, 125 (4th Cir. 1999) (involving transfer applicants to an elementary school magnet
program), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312-13 (2003) (involving law school
admissions). While the lack of a merit-based competition for slots in magnet programs
makes these situations distinguishable, they both involve a limited number of slots for
access to a specialized curriculum. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F.
Supp. 2d 358, 380-81 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (indicating that admission to a high school offering
magnet programs not offered at other schools would be treated differently than a district's
general student assignment plan),
266. See Liu, supra note 189 (indicating that courts may approach narrow tailoring
differently for selective high schools, magnet schools, and charter schools, than for general
student assignment plans). But see Boger, supra note 234, at 55 ("Neither Tuttle's
weighted lottery plan for magnet schools nor Eisenberg's transfer plan . . . purported to
assess the individual merit of student applicants . . . thus, the considerations of fairness
that were central in the 1st Circuit's decision in ... Wessman . . . are not applicable in the
more routine assignment case.").
267. See Boger, supra note 234. Whereas special programs offered by schools have a
limited number of slots, general assignment plans guarantee that each student will attend a
school. Id. The Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights describes the absence of a limited
benefit as such:
Access to second-grade teachers or fifth-grade classrooms ... is not a scarce
resource but a public good. Every child is sent to school; no child is denied. Of
course, every public elementary and secondary school has its own special
characteristics: its history, its identifying architectural features, its corps of
teachers (each with their own special talents and personalities). Yet as Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed in Bustop, Inc., there is no "federal right" granted
any parent or child that assures attendance at any particular public school. For
legal purposes, public schools have been deemed equivalent and fungible, and to
that extent, at least, our law normally recognizes no "winners" and "losers" in
the distribution of public school resources.
Id. (endnotes omitted).
268. Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *40 (noting that both parties stipulated
that all schools offered a comparable education); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., dissenting) (noting that
"perceived or actual differences in academic quality" did not create a competition for
limited benefits), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005). In the
Seattle case, the dissent went on to explain that even when taking into account perceptions
about the quality of high schools in the districts, every student had the opportunity to
enroll in at least one of the preferred schools. Id. (Graber, J., dissenting).
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goals of the Supreme Court's desegregation cases."' Thus, courts should
afford such plans a nuanced narrow tailoring analysis by deemphasizing
the need for individualized consideration required under Grutter and
270acknowledging the limited burden placed on third parties. To do so
would maintain a tight fit between the ends and means while also
furthering the promise of Brown. 1
C. Avoiding Proportionality in School District Policies
Although more contextualized judicial application of strict scrutiny is
272necessary, school districts must do their part to use race appropriately.
The Court has clearly indicated resistance to any use of proportionality
when race is involved273 and has instead expressed a preference for
measures aimed at achieving a "critical mass" of diversity. 74 Future
school assignment plans will have greater likelihood of surviving strict
scrutiny if they seek a range of diversity focused on attaining a "critical
mass," at which point the benefits of diversity begin to accrue.275
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's desegregation and affirmative action
jurisprudence seemingly collide when voluntary integration plans are
276challenged. To resolve the inherent tension between the ideal of
269. See supra Part I.B.
270. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
271. See Robinson 11, supra note 10, at 73. Describing the necessary fit between ends
and means, the author states:
[T]he Supreme Court is most concerned about illegitimate discrimination tactics
disguised as legitimate admissions programs. This danger is not present when a
local school board acts to remedy clearly identifiable ... racial isolation .... In
these instances, programs seek to implement the very concept that the Supreme
Court itself set forth [over] 50 years ago.
Id. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).
272. See Comfort, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21791, at *62 ("[C]harting a course that
depends upon racial classifications is, in constitutional terms, risky business.").
273. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003); see also Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467,494 (1992).
274. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36 (describing how attaining a critical mass of a
minority group does not transform it into a quota),
275. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 242-48. The plan approved by the
district court in McFarland offers one solution: by first considering a variety of other
factors, with race serving only as a permissible "tipping" factor under narrow
circumstances, the plan avoided mechanical application aimed at proportionality.
McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 859 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
276. See Tushnet, supra note 37, at 138. Professor Tushnet describes the tensions
engendered by Brown as such:
Race does not matter, constitutionally, because the Constitution deals with
individuals, not groups; but race does matter ... because the experiences of the
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integrated schools and our society's aversion to race-based decisions,
277both courts and school districts must make efforts to adapt. As courts
have used affirmative action precedent from outside the K-12 context to
strike down student assignment plans, they have failed to grasp the
unique nature of public schools.278 To keep the promise of Brown intact,
courts must begin to employ a more contextualized approach to strict
scrutiny that recognizes the distinct characteristics in K-12 public
schools.2" 9 At the same time, however, school districts must avoid school
assignment plans designed to achieve racial proportionality, and instead
strive to achieve a "critical mass" of students in racially isolated
settings.280
nation's racial groups differ . . . . As Americans, we seem to think both that
eliminating race as a basis for government decision making is an important
national goal, and that because race does matter in shaping our experiences,
governments should be allowed and sometimes encouraged to take race into
account in making policy. Brown's legacy has been to show that grappling with
the tensions in our views about race and social policy will be a continuing
challenge in the next fifty years as well as the last.
Id. at 138.
277. See discussion supra Part III.A-C.
278. The Massachusetts district court summed up this sentiment best, stating:
To say that school officials in the K-12 grades . .. cannot take steps to remedy the
extraordinary problems of de facto segregation and promote multiracial learning,
is to go further than ever before to disappoint the promise of Brown. It is to
admit that ... resegregation of the schools is a tolerable result, as if the only
problems Brown addressed were bad people and not bad impacts.
Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 391 (D. Mass. 2003),
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., No. 03-2415, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 21791 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2004), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (lst Cir. Nov. 24, 2004).
279. See discussion supra Part III.B. Indicating the need for courts to balance
affirmative action principles with the legacy of Brown, Justice Breyer has stated:
Brown and Grutter express the same educational hope, a hope that concerns
"the opportunity of an education." Brown says that it is a "right which must be
made available to all on equal terms." Grutter adds that educators must have
"affirmative action" leeway so that they, together with others, may turn Brown's
hope into reality,
Stephen G. Breyer, Turning Brown's Hope into Reality, in BROWN AT 50: THE
UNFINISHED LEGACY 146, supra note 42, at 142, 146.
280. See discussion supra Part III.C.
Catholic University Law Review
1000
